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ABSTRACT
Over 13 months in 2016–17 the US Federal Communications
Commission conducted an “incentive auction” to repurpose
radio spectrum from broadcast television to wireless inter-
net. In the end, the auction yielded $19.8 billion, $10.05
billion of which was paid to 175 broadcasters for voluntarily
relinquishing their licenses across 14 UHF channels. Sta-
tions that continued broadcasting were assigned potentially
new channels to fit as densely as possible into the channels
that remained. The government netted more than $7 billion
(used to pay down the national debt) after covering costs.
A crucial element of the auction design was the construc-
tion of a solver, dubbed SATFC, that determined whether
sets of stations could be “repacked” in this way; it needed
to run every time a station was given a price quote. This
paper describes the process by which we built SATFC. We
adopted an approach we dub “deep optimization”, taking a
data-driven, highly parametric, and computationally inten-
sive approach to solver design. More specifically, to build
SATFC we designed software that could pair both complete
and local-search SAT-encoded feasibility checking with a wide
range of domain-specific techniques, such as constraint graph
decomposition and novel caching mechanisms that allow for
reuse of partial solutions from related, solved problems. We
then used automatic algorithm configuration techniques to
construct a portfolio of eight complementary algorithms to
be run in parallel, aiming to achieve good performance on
instances that arose in proprietary auction simulations. To
evaluate the impact of our solver in this paper, we built an
open-source reverse auction simulator. We found that within
the short time budget required in practice, SATFC solved
more than 95% of the problems it encountered. Furthermore,
the incentive auction paired with SATFC produced nearly
optimal allocations in a restricted setting and substantially
outperformed other alternatives at national scale.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many devices, including broadcast television receivers and
This paper builds in part on a conference publication by
the same authors, “Solving the Station Repacking Problem”,
which was published at AAAI 2016.
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cell phones, rely on the transmission of electromagnetic sig-
nals. These signals can interfere with each other, so transmis-
sion is regulated: e.g., in the US, by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC). Since electromagnetic spectrum
suitable for wireless transmission is a scarce resource and
since it is difficult for a central authority to assess the relative
merits of competing claims on it, since 1994 the FCC has
used spectrum auctions to allocate broadcast rights (see, e.g.,
[27]). Many regulators around the world have followed suit.
At this point, in the US (as in many other countries), most
useful radio spectrum has been allocated. Interest has thus
grown in the reallocation of radio spectrum from less to more
valuable uses. Spectrum currently allocated to broadcast
television has received particular attention, for two reasons.
First, over-the-air television has been losing popularity with
the rise of cable, satellite, and streaming services. Second,
the upper UHF frequencies used by TV broadcasters are par-
ticularly well suited to wireless data transmission on mobile
devices—for which demand is growing rapidly—as they can
penetrate walls and travel long distances [23].
It thus made sense for at least some broadcasters to sell
their licenses to wireless internet providers willing to pay for
them. Ideally, these trades would have occurred bilaterally
and without government involvement, as occurs in many
other markets. However, two key obstacles made such trade
unlikely to produce useful, large-scale spectrum reallocation,
both stemming from the fact that wireless internet services re-
quire large, contiguous blocks of spectrum to work efficiently.
First, a buyer’s decision about which block of spectrum to
buy would limit the buyer to trading only with broadcasters
holding licenses to parts of that block; it could be hard or
impossible to find such a block in which all broadcasters
were willing to trade. Second, each of these broadcasters
would have “holdout power”, meaning the broadcaster could
demand an exorbitant payment in exchange for allowing the
deal to proceed. The likely result would have been very little
trade, even if broadcasters valued the spectrum much less
than potential buyers.
A 2012 Act of Congress implemented a clever solution to
this problem. It guaranteed each broadcaster interference-
free coverage in its broadcast area on some channel, but
not necessarily on its currently used channel. This meant
that if a broadcaster was unwilling to sell its license it could
instead be moved to another channel, solving the holdout
problem. To free up the channel that would permit this move
to take place, broadcast rights could be bought from another
station in the appropriate geographical area, even if this
second station did not hold a license for spectrum due for
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reallocation. In what follows, we call such an interference-free
reassignment of channels to stations a feasible repacking.
These trades and channel reassignments were coordinated
via a novel spectrum auction run by the FCC between March
2016 and April 2017, dubbed the Incentive Auction. It con-
sisted of two interrelated parts. The first was a forward
auction that sold large blocks of upper UHF spectrum to
interested buyers in a manner similar to previous auctions
of unallocated spectrum. The key innovation was the sec-
ond part: a reverse auction that was specially designed to
perform well in the Incentive Auction [28, 25]. It identi-
fied both a set of broadcasters who would voluntarily give
up their broadcast rights and prices at which they would
be compensated, simultaneously ensuring that all remain-
ing broadcasters could feasibly be repacked in the unsold
spectrum. The choice of how much spectrum to reallocate,
called the clearing target, linked these two parts: the incen-
tive auction alternated between reverse and forward auction
stages with progressively shrinking clearing targets until rev-
enue generated by the forward auction covered the cost of
purchasing and reassigning stations in the reverse auction.
We now describe the reverse auction’s rules in more detail.
First, all participating stations are given initial price quotes
and respond either that they agree to sell their broadcast
rights at the quoted price or that they “exit the auction”
(decline to participate), meaning that they will be guaranteed
some interference-free channel. The auction then repeatedly
iterates over the active bidders. Every time a bidder i is
considered, the software first checks whether i can be feasibly
repacked along with all exited stations. If such a feasible
repacking exists, i is given a (geometrically) lower price quote
and again has the options of accepting or exiting. Otherwise,
i is frozen: its price stops descending and it is no longer
active. The auction ends when all bidders are either frozen,
exited, or receive price quotes of zero.
The problem of checking the feasibility of repackings is
central to the reverse auction, likely to arise tens of thousands
of times in a single auction. Unfortunately, this problem is
NP-complete, generalizing graph coloring. The silver lining
is that interference constraints were known in advance—they
were derived based on the locations and broadcast powers of
existing television antennas—and so it was reasonable to hope
for a heuristic algorithm that achieved good performance
on the sorts of problems that would arise in a real auction.
However, identifying an algorithm that would be fast and
reliable enough to use in practice remained challenging. Since
each feasibility check depends on the results of those that
came before—if a station is found to be frozen, it cannot
exit—these problems must be solved sequentially. Time
constraints for the auction as a whole required that the
auction iterate through the stations at least twice a day, which
worked out to a time cutoff on the order of minutes. It was
thus inevitable that some problems would remain unsolved.
Luckily, the auction design is robust to such failures, treating
them as proofs of infeasibility at the expense of raising the
cost required to clear spectrum.
This paper describes our experience building SATFC 2.3.1,
the feasibility checker used in the reverse auction. We lever-
aged automatic algorithm configuration approaches to derive
a portfolio of complementary algorithms that differ in their
underlying (local and complete) search strategies, SAT en-
codings, constraint graph decompositions, domain-specific
heuristics, and use of a novel caching scheme. We use the
term “deep optimization” to refer to this approach,1 with the
goal of emphasizing its conceptual similarity to deep learning.
Classical machine learning relied on features crafted based on
expert insight, model families selected manually, and model
hyperparameters tuned essentially by hand. Deep learning
has shown that it is often possible to achieve substantially
better performance by relying less on expert knowledge and
more on enormous amounts of computation and huge train-
ing sets. Specifically, deep learning considers parametric
models of very high dimension, using expert knowledge only
to identify appropriate invariances and model biases, such
as convolutional structure. (In some cases it is critical that
these models be “deep” in the sense of having long chains of
dependencies between parameters, but in other cases great
flexibility can be achieved even with models only a couple
of levels deep; e.g., [34].) We argue that a similar dynamic
applies in the case of heuristic algorithms for discrete opti-
mization, which aim to achieve good performance on some
given dataset rather than in the worst case. Traditionally,
experts have designed such heuristic algorithms by hand, iter-
atively conducting small experiments to refine their designs.
We advocate an approach in which a computationally inten-
sive procedure is used to search a high-dimensional space of
parameterized algorithm designs to optimize performance
over a large set of training data. We aim to minimize the
role played by expert knowledge, restricting it to the identi-
fication of parameters that could potentially lead to fruitful
algorithm designs. We also encourage deep dependencies via
chains of parameters each of whose meaning depends on the
value taken by one or more parents.
Overall, this paper demonstrates the value of the deep
optimization approach via the enormous performance gains
it yielded on the challenging and socially important problem
of spectrum repacking. After formally stating the station
repacking problem, we define our large algorithm design space
and the search techniques we used. We assess the results on
problems that arose in runs of our new open-source reverse
auction simulator, investigating both our solver’s runtime
and its impact on economic outcomes.
2. THE STATION REPACKING PROBLEM
We now describe the station repacking problem in more de-
tail.2 Each television station in the US and Canada s ∈ S is
1There exists a large body of prior work that investigates
the use of algorithm configuration to design novel algorithms
from large, parameterized spaces (some of which, indeed,
we have coauthored); we believe, however, that the work
described in this paper is the most consequential application
of such techniques to date. Much of the literature just
mentioned focuses on algorithm configuration tools [16, 26,
15, 2, 32, 20] (which we take as given in this paper) rather
than algorithm design methodology. Most work in the latter
vein either addresses the much broader problem of algorithm
synthesis (e.g., [29, 5, 31]) or defines the overall approach
only implicitly (e.g., [22]). The most prominent exception is
“programming by optimization” [14]; however, it emphasizes
connections to software engineering and does not limit itself
to parametric design spaces.
2 Similar problems have been studied in other contexts,
falling under the umbrella of frequency assignment problems.
See e.g., [1] for a survey and a discussion of applications
to mobile telephony, radio and TV broadcasting, satellite
communication, wireless LANs, and military operations. We
are not aware of other published work that aims to optimize
feasibility checking in the Incentive Auction setting.
Figure 1: Interference graph visualizing the FCC’s
constraint data [9] (2 990 stations; 2 575 466 channel-
specific interference constraints).
currently assigned to a channel cs ∈ C ⊆ N that ensures that
it will not excessively interfere with other, nearby stations.
(Although Canadian stations did not participate in the auc-
tion, they were eligible to be reassigned new channels.) The
FCC determined pairs of channel assignments that would
cause harmful interference based on a complex, grid-based
physical simulation (“OET-69” [7]); this pairwise constraint
data is publicly available [9]. Let I ⊆ (S × C)2 denote a
set of forbidden station–channel pairs {(s, c), (s′, c′)}, each
representing the proposition that stations s and s′ may not
concurrently be assigned to channels c and c′, respectively.
The effect of the auction was to remove some broadcasters
from the airwaves and to reassign channels to the remaining
stations from a reduced set. This reduced set was defined by
a clearing target, fixed for each stage of the reverse auction,
corresponding to some channel c ∈ C such that all stations are
only eligible to be assigned channels from C = {c ∈ C | c < c}.
Each station can only be assigned a channel on a subset of
C, given by a domain function D : S → 2C that maps from
stations to these reduced sets. The station repacking problem
is then the task of finding a repacking γ : S → C that assigns
each station a channel from its domain that satisfies the
interference constraints: i.e., for which γ(s) ∈ D(s) for all
s ∈ S, and γ(s) = c⇒ γ(s′) 6= c′ for all {(s, c), (s′, c′)} ∈ I.
A problem instance thus corresponds to a set of stations
S ⊆ S and channels C ⊆ C into which they must be packed,
with domains D and constraints I implicitly being restricted
to S and C; we call the resulting restrictions D and I.
Why should we hope that this (NP-complete) problem can
be solved effectively in practice? First, we only need to be
concerned with problems involving subsets of a fixed set of
stations and a fixed set of interference constraints: those
describing the television stations currently broadcasting in
the United States and Canada. Let us define the interfer-
ence graph as an undirected graph in which there is one
vertex per station and an edge exists between two vertices
s and s′ if the corresponding stations participate together
in any interference constraint: i.e., if there exist c, c′ ∈ C
such that {(s, c), (s′, c′)} ∈ I. Figure 1 shows the Incentive
Auction interference graph. As it turns out, interference con-
straints come in two kinds. Co-channel constraints specify
that two stations may not be assigned to the same channel;
adjacent-channel constraints specify that two stations may
not be assigned to two nearby channels. Hence, any forbidden
station–channel pairs are of the form {(s, c), (s′, c+ i)} for
some stations s, s′ ∈ S, channel c ∈ C, and i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Fur-
thermore, channels can be partitioned into three equivalence
classes: LVHF (channels 1–6), HVHF (channels 7–13), and
UHF (channels 14–51) with the property that no interference
constraint involves channels in more than one band.
Second, note that we are not interested in optimizing worst-
case performance even given our fixed interference graph, but
rather in achieving good performance on the sort of instances
generated by actual reverse auctions. These instances depend
on the order in which stations exit the auction, which depends
on stations’ valuations, which depend in turn (among many
other factors) on the size and character of the population
reached by their broadcasts. The distribution over repacking
problems is hence far from uniform.
Third, descending clock auctions repeatedly generate sta-
tion repacking problems by adding a single station s+ to
a set S− of provably repackable stations. This means that
every station repacking problem (S− ∪ {s+}, C) comes with
a partial assignment γ− : S− → C that we know is feasible
on restricted station set S−; we will see in what follows that
this fact is extremely useful.
Finally, many repacking problems are trivial: in our experi-
ence, problems involving only VHF channels can all be solved
quickly; furthermore, the vast majority of UHF problems
can be solved greedily simply by checking whether s+ can be
augmented directly with γ−. However, solving the remaining
problems is crucial to the economic outcomes achieved by
the auction (as we show in Section 6). In what follows, we
restrict ourselves to “non-trivial” UHF problems that cannot
be solved by greedy feasibility checking.
3. A DEEP OPTIMIZATION APPROACH
As we show in our experiments (see Section 5), off-the-
shelf solvers could not solve a large enough fraction of station
repacking problems to be effective in practice. To do better,
we needed a customized algorithm optimized to perform well
on our particular distribution of station repacking problems.
We built our algorithm via the deep optimization approach,
meaning that we aimed to use our own insight only to identify
design ideas that showed promise, relegating the work of
combining these ideas and evaluating the performance of the
resulting algorithm on realistic data (see Section 4) to an
automatic search procedure.
3.1 The Design Space
Our first task was thus to identify a space of algorithm
designs to consider. This was not just a pen-and-paper ex-
ercise, since each point in the space needed to correspond
to runnable code. We focused on encoding station repack-
ing as a propositional satisfiability (SAT) problem. The
SAT formalism is well suited to station repacking, which
is a pure feasibility problem with only combinatorial con-
straints. (It may also be possible to achieve good perfor-
mance with MIP or other encodings; we did not investi-
gate such alternatives in depth.) The SAT reduction is
straightforward: given a station repacking problem (S,C)
with domains D and interference constraints I, we create
a Boolean variable xs,c ∈ {>,⊥} for every station–channel
pair (s, c) ∈ S × C, representing the proposition that station
s is assigned to channel c. We then create three kinds of
clauses: (1)
∨
d∈D(s) xs,d ∀s ∈ S (each station is assigned
at least one channel); (2) ¬xs,c ∨ ¬xs,c′ ∀s ∈ S, ∀c, c′ 6=
c ∈ D(s) (each station is assigned at most one channel); (3)
¬xs,c ∨ ¬xs′,c′ ∀{(s, c), (s′, c′)} ∈ I (interference constraints
are respected). Note that (2) is optional: if a station is
assigned more than one channel, we can simply pick one
channel to assign it from among these channels arbitrarily.
We thus created a parameter indicating whether to include
these constraints. In the end, a SAT encoding of a problem
involving all stations at a clearing target of 36 involved 73 187
variables and 2 917 866 clauses.
3.1.1 Selecting Solvers
Perhaps the most important top-level parameter deter-
mines which SAT solver to run. (Of course, each such solver
will have its own (deep) parameter space; other parameters
will describe design dimensions orthogonal to the choice of
solver, as we will discuss in what follows.) The SAT commu-
nity has developed a very wide variety of solvers and made
them publicly available (see e.g., [19]). In principle, we would
have made it possible to choose every solver that offered even
reasonable performance. However, doing so would have been
too costly from the perspective of software integration and
(especially) reliability testing. We thus conducted initial
algorithm configuration experiments (see Section 3.2) on 20
state-of-the-art SAT solvers, drawn mainly from SAT solver
competition entries collected in AClib [18]. We illustrate
the performance of their default configurations later in Fig-
ure 2; most improved at least somewhat from their default
configurations as a result of algorithm configuration. We
identified two solvers that ended up with the strongest post-
configuration performance—one complete and one based on
local search—both of which have been shown in the literature
to adapt well to a wide range of SAT domains via large and
flexible parameter spaces. Our first solver was clasp [12], an
open-source solver based on conflict-driven nogood learning
(98 parameters). Our second was the open-source SATen-
stein framework [22], which allows arbitrary composition of
design elements taken from a wide range of high-performance
stochastic local search solvers (90 parameters).
3.1.2 Using the Previous Solution
While adapting clasp and SATenstein to station repacking
data yielded substantial performance improvements, neither
reached a point sufficient for deployment in the real auction.
To do better, it was necessary to leverage specific properties
of the incentive auction problem. Rather than committing
to specific speedups, we exposed a wide variety of possibil-
ities via further parameters. We began by considering two
methods for taking advantage of the existence of a partial
assignment γ−. The first method checks whether a simple
transformation of γ− is enough to yield a satisfiable repack-
ing. Specifically, we construct a small SAT problem in which
the stations to be repacked are s+ and all stations Γ(s+) ⊆ S
neighboring s+ in the interference graph, fixing all other
stations S \ Γ(s+) to their assignments in γ−. Any solution
to this reduced problem must be a feasible repacking; how-
ever, if the reduced problem is infeasible we cannot conclude
anything. However (depending on the value of a parameter),
we can keep searching: unfixing all stations that neighbor a
station in Γ(s+), and so on.
Our second method uses γ− to initialize local search solvers.
Such solvers search a space of complete variable assignments,
typically following gradients to minimize an objective func-
tion such as the number of violated constraints, with occa-
sional random steps. They are thus sensitive to their starting
points. Optionally, we can start at the assignment given by
γ− (randomly initializing variables pertaining to s+). We
can also optionally redo this initialization on some fraction
of random restarts.
3.1.3 Problem Simplification
Next, we considered three preprocessing techniques that
can simplify station repacking problems. First, we added the
option to run the arc consistency algorithm, repeatedly prun-
ing values from each station’s domain that are incompatible
with every channel on a neighboring station’s domain.
Second, we enabled elimination of unconstrained stations.
A station s is unconstrained if, given any feasible assignment
of all of the other stations in S \ s, there always exists
some way of feasibly repacking s. Unconstrained stations
can be removed without changing a problem’s satisfiability
status. Various algorithms exist for identifying unconstrained
stations; we determine this choice via a parameter. (All
such stations can be found via a reduction to the polytime
problem of eliminating variables in a binary CSP [3]; various
sound but incomplete heuristics run more quickly but identify
progressively fewer unconstrained stations.)
Third, the interference graph induced by a problem may
consist of multiple connected components; we can optionally
run a linear-time procedure to separate them into distinct
SAT problems. We only need to solve the component to
which s+ belongs: γ− supplies feasible assignments for all
others. Arc consistency and unconstrained station removal
can simplify the interference graph by removing edges and
nodes respectively. This can shrink the size of the component
containing s+ and make this technique even more effective.
3.1.4 Containment Caching
Finally, we know that every repacking problem will be
derived from a restriction of the interference graph to some
subset of S. We know this graph in advance of the auction;
this suggests the possibility of doing offline work to precom-
pute solutions. However, our graph has 2 990 nodes, and the
number of restricted graphs is thus 22990 ≈ 10900. Thus, it
is not possible to consider all of them offline.
Not every restricted problem is equally likely to arise in
practice. To target likely problems, we could simply run a
large number of simulations and cache the solution to every
repacking problem encountered. Unfortunately, we found
that it was extremely rare for problems to repeat across
sufficiently different simulator inputs, even after running
hundreds of simulations (generating millions of instances and
costing years of CPU time). However, we can do better than
simply looking for previous solutions to a given repacking
problem. If we know that S is repackable then we know the
same is true for every S′ ⊆ S (and indeed, we know the
packing itself—the packing for S restricted to the stations
in S′). Similarly, if we know that S was not packable then
we know the same for every S′ ⊇ S. This observation
dramatically magnifies the usefulness of each cached entry
S, because each S can be used to answer queries about an
exponential number of subsets or supersets. This is especially
useful because sometimes it can be harder to find a repacking
for subsets of S than it can be to find a repacking for S.
We call a cache meant to be used in this way a containment
cache, because it is queried to determine whether one set
contains another (i.e., whether the query contains the cache
item or vice versa). To the best of our knowledge, contain-
ment caching is a novel idea. A likely reason why this scheme
is not already common is that querying a containment cache
is nontrivial: one cannot simply index entries with a hash
function; instead, an exponential number of keys can match
a given query. We were nevertheless able to construct an
algorithm that solved this problem quickly in our setting.
We observe that containment caching is applicable to any
family of feasibility testing problems generated as subsets of
a master set of constraints, not just to spectrum repacking.
In more detail, we maintain two caches, a feasible cache
and an infeasible cache, and store each problem we solve
in the appropriate cache. We leverage the methods from
Section 3.1.3 to enhance the efficiency of our cache, storing
full instances for SAT problems and the smallest simplified
component for UNSAT problems. When asked whether it
is possible to repack station set S, we first check whether
a subset of S belongs to the infeasible cache (in which case
the original problem is infeasible); if we find no matches, we
decompose the problem into its smallest simplified component
and check if the feasible cache contains a superset of those
stations, in which case the original problem is feasible.
3.2 Searching the Design Space
Overall, our design space had 191 parameters, nested as
much as 4 levels deep. We now describe how we searched this
space to building a customized solver. Identifying a set of
parameters that optimize a given algorithm’s performance on
a given dataset is called algorithm configuration. There exist
a wide variety of algorithm configuration tools [16, 26, 15, 2].
We used Sequential Model-based Algorithm Configuration
(SMAC) [15], the publicly available method that arguably
achieves the best performance (see e.g., [17]). SMAC uses
the “Bayesian optimization” approach of interleaving ran-
dom sampling and the exploration of algorithm designs that
appear promising based on a learned model.
Unfortunately, even after performing algorithm configura-
tion, it is rare to find a single algorithm that outperforms
all others on instances of an NP-complete problem such as
SAT. This inherent variability across solvers can be exploited
by algorithm portfolios [13, 30, 33]. Most straightforwardly,
one selects a small set of algorithms with complementary
performance on problems of interest and, when asked to solve
a new instance, executes them in parallel. Of course, we
wanted to construct such algorithm portfolios automatically
as part of our deep optimization approach. We did this by
using a method called Hydra [32] which runs iteratively, at
each step directing the algorithm configurator to optimize
marginal gains over the given portfolio. This allows Hydra
to find algorithms that may perform poorly overall but that
complement the existing portfolio. Overall, we ran Hydra for
eight steps, thereby producing a portfolio of novel solvers
(dubbed SATFC) that could run on a standard eight-core
workstation. The Incentive Auction used SATFC 2.3.1, which
is available online at https://github.com/FCC/SATFC.
4. DATA FROM AUCTION SIMULATIONS
During the development of SATFC [11] the FCC shared
with us a wide range of anonymized problem instances that
arose in auction simulations they performed in order to
validate the auction design. These formed the “training set”
we used in the deep optimization process when constructing
SATFC 2.3.1. These simulations explored a very narrow set of
answers to the questions of which stations would participate
and how bidders would interact with the auction mechanism;
they do not represent a statement either by us or by the
FCC about how these questions were resolved in the real
auction (indeed, by law the answers will not be revealed to
us or to the public for two years). It is of course impossible
to guarantee that variations in the assumptions would not
have yielded computationally different problems.
While SATFC 2.3.1 is itself open-source software, it is
unfortunately impossible for us to share the data that was
used to build it. In this paper, we have opted for what we
hope is the next best thing: evaluating SATFC 2.3.1 and
various alternatives using a publicly available test set. We
thus wrote our own reverse auction simulator and released
it as open source software (see http://cs.ubc.ca/labs/beta/
Projects/SATFC). We used this simulator to simulate 20
auctions, in each case randomly sampling bidder valuations
from a publicly available model [6] using parameters obtained
directly from its authors. This model specifies stations’ values
for broadcasting in UHF, vs,UHF. Of course, a station has no
value for going off air: vs,OFF = 0. In some cases the reverse
auction can reassign a UHF station to a channel in one of
two less valuable VHF bands (LVHF, HVHF) in exchange
for lesser compensation. We assume that vs,HVHF =
2
3
vs,UHF
and vs,LVHF =
1
3
vs,UHF. We excluded from our simulator all
stations for which the authors of the model were unable to
supply us with parameters: stations outside the mainland
US and Hawaii, all US VHF stations, and an additional 25
US UHF stations. This left us with 1 638 eligible US stations.
We further included all Canadian stations in our simulations:
because the auction rules forbade them from being paid to
leave their home bands, we did not need to model their
valuations. Specifically, from Canada we included 113 LVHF
stations, 332 HVHF stations, and 348 UHF stations.
We set the auction’s opening prices to the values announced
by the FCC in November 2015 [10]. We assumed that stations
chose to participate in the reverse auction if their opening
price offer for going off air was greater than their valuation
for remaining on air in their current band. We assumed
that stations always selected the option that myopically
maximized their utility. We used the interference constraints
and station domains announced by the FCC in November
2015 [9]. For each simulation, we used the largest clearing
target for which we could find a feasible assignment for the
non-participating stations; in all cases this led to a clearing
target of 84 Mhz, corresponding to a maximum allowable
channel of 36. We note that this is the amount of spectrum
actually cleared by the Incentive Auction. Just like the real
auction, an auction simulator needs a feasibility checker to
determine which price movements are possible. We used
SATFC 2.3.1 with a cutoff of 60 seconds. We sampled 10 000
“nontrivial” UHF problems uniformly at random from all of
the problems across all simulations to use as our dataset,
where we defined nontrivial problems as those that could
not be solved by greedily augmenting the previous solution.
Fewer than 3% of UHF problems in our simulations were
nontrivial. This test set consisted of 9 482 feasible problems,
121 infeasible problems, and 397 problems that timed out at
our one minute cutoff and therefore have unknown feasibility.
5. RUNTIME PERFORMANCE
We now evaluate SATFC’s performance by contrasting
it with various off-the-shelf alternatives. The FCC’s ini-
tial investigations included modeling the station repack-
Figure 2: Empirical Cumulative Density Function
(ECDF) of runtimes for default configurations of
MIP and SAT solvers and for SATFC 2.3.1. The
curves show fraction of instances solved (y axis)
within different amounts of time (x axis; note the
log scale). The legend is ordered by percentage of
problems solved before the cutoff. The histogram in-
dicates density of SAT and UNSAT instances binned
by their (fastest) runtimes; unsatisfiable instances
constituted fewer than 1% of solved instances.
ing problem as a mixed-integer program (MIP) and using
off-the-shelf solvers paired with problem-specific speedups
[8]. Unfortunately, the problem-specific elements of this
solution were not publicly released, so we cannot evalu-
ate them in this article. Instead, to assess the feasibility
of a MIP approach, we ran what are arguably the two
best-performing MIP solvers—CPLEX and Gurobi—on our
test set of 10 000 non-trivial instances. To encode the sta-
tion repacking problem as a MIP, we created a variable
xs,c ∈ {0, 1} for every station–channel pair, representing
the proposition that station s is assigned to channel c. We
imposed the constraints
∑
c∈D(s) xs,c = 1 ∀ s ∈ S and
xs,c + xs′,c′ ≤ 1 ∀ {(s, c), (s′, c′)} ∈ I, ensuring that each sta-
tion is assigned to exactly one channel and that interference
constraints are not violated. Both MIP solvers solved under
half of the instances within our cutoff time of one minute;
the results are shown in Figure 2. Such performance would
likely have been insufficient for deployment in practice, since
it implies unnecessarily high payments to many stations.
As already discussed, there exist a wide variety of SAT
solvers that are available for use off the shelf. Figure 2
illustrates the performance of the 20 state-of-the-art solvers
we considered in our initial configuration experiments in their
default configurations. With few exceptions, the SAT solvers
outperformed the MIP solvers, as can be seen by comparing
the solid and dashed lines in Figure 2. However, runtimes
and percentages of instances solved by the cutoff time were
still not good enough for us to recommend deployment of
any of these solvers in the actual auction. The best solver
in its default configuration, Gnovelty+PCL, was able to solve
the largest number of problems—79.96%—within the cutoff.
(As mentioned earlier, the SATenstein design space includes
Gnovelty+PCL alongside many other solvers.) The parallel
portfolio of all 20 solvers from Figure 2 was little better,
being able to solve only 81.58% of problems.
We now turn to SATFC 2.3.1. This 8-solver parallel port-
folio stochastically dominated every individual solver that
we considered and achieved very substantial gains after a
few tenths of a second. It solved 87.73% of the problems
in under a second and 96.03% within the one-minute cutoff
time. The histogram at the bottom of the figure indicates
satisfiability status of instances solved by SATFC grouped
by runtime; our instances were overwhelmingly satisfiable.
6. IMPACT ON ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
We now ask whether SATFC’s improved performance is
likely to have translated into a better economic outcome
in the Incentive Auction, assessing both cost and efficiency.
The cost of an auction is the sum of payments to the winning
stations. To assess efficiency we measured the total value
lost by the auction, comparing the sums of values of stations
for their allocated bands both before and after the auction.3
If we can find an efficient repacking γ∗, then we can compute
the additional fraction of value lost by some other repacking
γ. We call this the value loss ratio:
∑
s∈S vs,pre(s)−vs,post(γ,s)∑
s∈S vs,pre(s)−vs,post(γ∗,s) ,
where pre(s) returns the band to which s was assigned before
the auction and post(γ, s) returns either the band to which
s is assigned under channel assignment γ or OFF if s is
not assigned to a band under γ. When it is intractable to
compute γ∗, we resort to comparing the absolute value loss
between different assignments.
Given our interest in the efficiency of the reverse auction,
it is natural to compare it to the VCG mechanism, which
always chooses the optimal packing γ∗. VCG pays losing
stations nothing and pays each winning station s the differ-
ence between the sum of values of stations other than s for
γ∗ and the sum of the same stations’ values for a packing
that is optimal subject to the constraint that s does not win.
We identified these optimal packings using the MIP encod-
ing from Section 5 with two changes. First, we added the
objective of maximizing the aggregate values of the participat-
ing stations: maximize
∑
s∈Sbidding
∑
c∈D(s) xs,c · vs,band(c),
where band (c) is a function that returns the corresponding
band for a given channel. Second, we allowed the option of
not assigning a channel to a bidding station.
6.1 Greater New York City Simulations
Unfortunately, it was impossible to solve these optimiza-
tion problems at a national scale, even given several days of
computing time. We therefore constructed tractable prob-
lems by restricting ourselves to stations in the vicinity of
New York City, which we chose because it corresponds to
one of the most densely connected regions in the interference
graph. More specifically, we dropped all Canadian stations
3 The more standard measure of efficiency—the sum of sta-
tions’ values for their allocated bands—has the same opti-
mum. Value loss has the advantage that it is influenced only
by stations that a feasibility checker is unable to repack in
their home bands; it is thus more appropriate for comparing
feasibility checkers. The more standard measure is sensitive
to changes in the values of easy-to-repack stations, even those
that do not participate in any interference constraints.
Figure 3: Comparing value loss and cost of the greedy feasibility checker, picoSAT, and SATFC 2.3.1 for 20
different value profiles. (Left) Fraction of VCG cost versus fraction of VCG value loss for Greater New York
City simulations. All VCG points lie at (1,1). (Right) Value loss and cost for national simulations.
and restricted ourselves to the UHF band using the smallest
possible clearing target (maximum allowable channel of 29).
Using the interference graph induced by these restrictions,
we then dropped every station whose shortest path length
to a station in New York City exceeded two. The result
was a setting with 218 stations and 78 499 channel-specific
interference constraints, yielding a MIP encoding with 2 465
variables and 78 717 constraints.
We randomly generated 20 different valuation profiles,
using the methodology described in Section 4 but restricting
ourselves to the stations in the restricted interference graph.
For each valuation profile, we conducted four simulations.
The first was of a VCG auction; we computed allocations and
payments using CPLEX, solving all MIPs optimally to within
10−6 absolute MIP gap tolerance. We also ran three reverse
auction simulations for each valuation profile, varying the
feasibility checker to consider two alternatives to SATFC.
The first is the greedy feasibility checker, which represents
the simplest reasonable feasibility checker and thus serves
as a baseline. The second is the default configuration of
picoSAT. To our knowledge, alongside MIP approaches this is
the only other solver that has been used in publications on
the Incentive Auction [21, 4], probably because we showed it
to be the best among a set of alternatives in an early talk
on the subject [24].
In total, our 80 simulations consumed over 5 years of CPU
time (dominated by the VCG simulations). Figure 3 (left)
illustrates the results. Each point shows the value loss (x
axis) and cost (y axis) of a single simulation; in both cases,
these quantities are normalized by the corresponding quan-
tity achieved by VCG for the same valuation profile. The
SATFC simulations had a mean value loss ratio of 1.048 and
a mean cost ratio of 0.760, indicating that the reverse auction
achieved nearly optimal efficiency at much lower cost than
VCG. The picoSAT results were nearly identical, differing in
only two value profiles, and then only slightly. Both the
SATFC and picoSAT runs dominated the greedy runs accord-
ing to both metrics; on average, reverse auctions based on
greedy cost 1.742 times more and lost 1.366 times as much
broadcaster value than those based on SATFC. Despite these
differences, all of the solvers were able to solve a very large
fraction of the feasibility checking problems encountered in
their respective simulations (which took different trajectories
once two solvers differed in their ability to solve a given prob-
lem): 99.978%, 99.945%, and 99.118% for SATFC, picoSAT,
and greedy respectively (including trivial problems).
6.2 National Simulations
We were more interested in economic outcomes at the na-
tional scale, even though we could not simulate VCG in such
a large setting. We generated 20 valuation profiles for our
full set of stations and ran reverse auction simulations using
our three feasibility checkers. In total, these experiments
consumed over 5 days of CPU time.
All solvers were again able to solve a large fraction of the
problems they encountered: 99.902%, 99.765%, and 98.031%
for SATFC, picoSAT, and greedy respectively (including triv-
ial problems). The economic impact of these differences is
illustrated in Figure 3 (right). In this graph, x- and y-axis
values correspond to unnormalized value loss and cost respec-
tively. Each SATFC and picoSAT simulation again dominated
its greedy counterpart in both efficiency and cost. Averaging
over all of our observations, reverse auctions based on greedy
feasibility checking cost 3.550 times ($5.114 billion) more
and lost 2.850 times as much ($2.030 billion) broadcaster
value than those based on SATFC. At the larger scale we also
found that SATFC dominated picoSAT in every simulation:
on average, picoSAT auctions cost 1.495 times ($987 million)
more and lost 1.427 times as much ($469 million) value than
SATFC auctions.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Station repacking in the Incentive Auction is a difficult but
important problem, with progress translating into significant
gains in both government expenditures and social welfare.
We designed a customized solution to this problem using
an approach we dub deep optimization. Specifically, we
drew on a large parameterized design space to construct a
strong portfolio of heuristic algorithms: SATFC 2.3.1, an
open-source solver that was used in the real auction. To
evaluate it for this paper, we conducted experiments with
a new reverse auction simulator. We found that replacing
SATFC with an off-the-shelf feasibility checker resulted in
both efficiency losses and increased costs. It thus appears
likely that our efforts led to significant economic benefits to
broadcasters, the US government, and the American public.
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